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TORTS-NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTRESS-
MAINE AND MICHIGAN ABOLISH THE "IMPACT RULE"
On July 16, 1963, at approximately 10:00 P.M. Charles LaCroix was
driving down the highway, when his car suddenly veered :across the road,
traveled 63 feet in the air, 209 feet from the highway, and sheared off a
utility pole. As a result, a number of high voltage lines snapped, coming
in contact with the power lines leading into the house of Leonard H.
Daley, causing a great electrical explosion, considerable property damage,
and allegedly engendering emotional disturbance and nervousness in Da-
ley's wife and child.'
The trial court directed a verdict against Estelle and TinI othy Daley as to
their claim for emotional disturbance, and the court of appeals 2 affirmed
the verdict on the ground that Michigan law does not allow recovery for
emotional disturbance resulting from negligence unless there is a physi-
cal impact3 inflicted upon the person contemporaneously, with the fright
or nervous shock. The Supreme Court of Michigan, concluding that the
absence of a contemporaneous physical impact would no longer be an au-
tomatic bar to recovery in Michigan, reversed the court of appeals, and
remanded the case for a new trial, so that Estelle and Timothy Daley
would be given an opportunity to show the causal connection between
their emotional disturbance and the negligence of LaCroix. Daley v. La-
Croix, - Mich. -, 179 N.W. 2d 390 (1970). 1
On December 23, 1966, Malcolm H. Wallace entered a store known as
Lindley's in Canton, Maine, and as was the custom in this store, Wallace
removed a bottle of Coca-Cola from a non coin-operIted cooler. He
opened the bottle, and upon drinking from it, felt a foreign object touch
his tongue. This object was discovered to be an unpackaged prophylac-
tic. Wallace returned home, pondered this experience and became nau-
seous. Wallace continued to be ill for some time, resulting in his absence
from work.
1. The explosion and flashes of bluish light caused the Daleys to think that an
atomic bomb had been dropped. Brief of Appellant at 4, Daley, v. LaCroix, -
Mich. -, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970).
2. 13 Mich. App. 26, 163 N.W.2d 666 (1968).
3. "Impact" can be a physical injury, or a mild blow, and as explained in one de-
cision, the "impact rule" can be satisfied by any slight contact, even if no physical
injury is manifested. Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 317, 175 A.2d 351, 353
(1961).
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Finding the bottle to be purchased from Coca-Cola, and the foreign ob-
ject to be present at the time of purchase, the jury rendered a verdict for
Wallace in the sum of two thousand dollars. On appeal, the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Maine disagreed with the contention that there was no
compensable physical injury under Maine law. Instead, the court held
there can be recovery for foreseeable mental and emotional suffering
proximately caused by the negligence of another even though there is no
discernable trauma from external causes-thus abolishing the "impact
rule" in Maine. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants Inc., - Me. -,
269 A.2d 117 (1970).
The significance of the Wallace and Daley decisions is two-fold.4 First,
the cases abolish the requirement that there must be a contemporaneous
physical impact in order to recover for mental distress which has been
negligently inflicted. In this respect, these jurisdictions have joined the
majority position and have brought the "impact rule" two steps closer to its
imminent extinction, while at the same time augmenting the uniform appli-
cation of tort liability standards. Second, these decisions represent the
adoption in Maine and Michigan of a more flexible and progressive li-
ability formula for the negligent infliction of mental distress. The purpose
of this note is to examine the basis of the "impact rule," focusing in partic-
ular on why it is not a valid limitation on recovery, and to analyze the
contribution of the Wallace and Daley decisions to the development of a
rational liability formula in the area of negligently inflicted mental dis-
tress.
Determining the liability for invasions of mental tranquillity has been a
perplexing problem for both the courts of England and the United
States. Originally, the courts considered whether there should be any li-
ability for the negligent infliction of mental distress. 5 Later, the courts pro-
gressed to the issue of the limits of liability." In the 1888 English case of
Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas,7 the court faced this prob-
lem, and did not allow the plaintiff to recover for the damage to her nerv-
ous system which resulted from her fear of the defendant's oncoming
4. The decision in the Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., is also signifi-
cant in that it makes proof of tampering with the bottles by a third party an affirma-
tive defense, thus putting the burden of proof on the defendant. This aspect of the
decision will not be dealt with in this casenote. For a discussion of the topic see
Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 117 (1957); 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 28.14 at 1566 (1956).
5. See Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193 (1944).
6. Id.
7. L.R. 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).
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train. The court characterized the damages as too remote' but did not de-
cide that impact was an essential requirements Yet, this case has been
awarded the "dubious distinction" of being the "leading case for the propo-
sition that there can be no recovery for the physical results of mental an-
guish without impact . . . ." The Coultas decision, criticized and erod-
ed by subsequent cases,' 0 was overruled in England just thirteen years
later by the decision of Dulieu v. White & Sons,1 where the court al-
lowed the plaintiff to recover for the fright caused by the defendant's negli-
gent driving of a horse van, which caused the plaintiff to become ill and
give premature birth to an idiot child. The court reasoned:
That fright-where physical injury is directly produced by it-cannot be a ground of
action merely because of the absence of any accompanying impact appears to me to
be a contention both unreasonable and contrary to the weight ofi authority. 12
Thus, by 1901, the English Courts settled upon a rule allowing recovery
for the physical consequences of negligently inflicted emotional distress.
Unlike the English, the American courts struggled with divergent for-
mulas for the emotional distress cases. The early majority was comprised
of states requiring a contemporaneous physical impact.' 3  However, a
strong and ever-increasing minority existed, which applied the principles of
foreseeability and proximate causation to determine the liability for
causing mental distress. 14 The courts which denied liability without a con-
temporaneous physical impact argued that no precedent existed for al-
lowing recovery for the physical effects of fright; that the effects of fright
8. The court explained that".., the first question whether the damages are too
remote, should have been answered in the affirmative, and on that ground, without
saying that 'impact' is necessary, that the judgment should have been for the de-
fendants." id. at 226.
9. Daley v. LaCroix, supra note 1, at -, 179 N.W.2d at 393, n.6, citing Annot.,
64 A.L.R.2d 100, 135 (1959).
10. See Wilkinson v. Downtown, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57; Pugh v. London, B. & S.C.
Ry., [1896] 2 Q.B. 248 (Dictum); Bell v. Great Northern Ry., ['1890] 26 L.R. Ir.
428 (Ireland); Smith, supra note 5, at 201.
11. [1901] 2 K.B. 669.
12. Id. at 673-74.
13. See, e.g., St. Louis, I.M. & S. R.R., v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64! S.W. 226 (1901);
Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Kalen v. Terre Haute & I. R.R.,
18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N.E. 694 (1897); McArdle v. Peck Dry Goods Co., 191 Mo.
App. 263, 177 S.W. 1095 (1915); and Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R.R., 78
Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908).
14. See, e.g., Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205(1916); Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440 (1918); Goddard v. Watters,
14 Ga. App. 722, 82 S.E. 304 (1914); Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688
(1909); Purcell v. St. Paul City R.R., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Mack v.
South Bound R.R., 52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898); and Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210,
13 S.W. 59 (1890).
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caused by a negligent act were remote and not a proximate result thereof;
finally, that the existence of the emotional distress was too difficult to
prove, and allowing recovery would create a flood of litigation with many
fraudulent claims. An analysis of these arguments reveals they are based
more upon administrative expediency than upon fundamental concepts
of tort liability.
Originally, courts used the stare decisis principle to deny liability be-
cause no precedent existed, 15 then later used it to deny liability because
the previous courts had required impact.' This type of reasoning leads
to a liability formula based purely on experience, not logic.1 7
The counter-argument to the stare decisis basis of the "impact rule"
is two-fold. First, is the rationale that a court is following the finest
common-law tradition when it alters prior case law in the interest of jus-
tice.1 8 Second, when many of the cases were decided, there were no
precedents for a denial of liability, and existing principles allowed re-
covery for damages which were the proximate result of another's negli-
gence. As the court explained in Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale
Tailors:19
[I]f such injury results proximately although through the intermediate agency of
fright, it follows that the absence of reported cases does not show that there is no
liability therefor. If general legal principles impose such liability, the denial of lia-
bility must be an exception to the application of the principles. 20
There appears to be little merit in the stare decisis argument.
Apparently in an effort to refute the argument that liability for the
15. See, e.g., Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561
(1900); Lehman v. Brooklyn City R.R., 47 Hun. 355 (N.Y. 1888); Ewing v. Pitts-
burgh, C.C. & St. L. R.R., 147 Pa. St. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892), overruled, Niederman v.
Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Victorian Ry's Comm'rs v. Coultas, supra
note 7.
16. See, e.g., Herman v. Eastern Airlines, 149 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.Y. 1957)
(applying Virginia law); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian,
232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929).
17. Ironically, the statement that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it
has been [human] experience," HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 1 (1881), has been
used to both support and attack the existence of the "impact rule." In Niederman v.
Brodsky, supra note 15, at 416, 261 A.2d at 90 (dissent), it was used to support
the continued adherence to the rule, while in Daley v. LaCroix, supra note 1, at -,
179 N.W.2d at 394, n.8, it was used to criticize the validity of the "impact rule."
18. Battalla v. State of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 239, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 36 (1961), citing Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355, 102 N.E.2d 691,
694 (1951) [Noted in Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1250 (1953)]; Hill v. Kimball, supra
note 14, at 215, 13 S.W. at 59.
19. 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540 (1930).
20. Id. at 333, 150 A. at 542. Accord, Battalla v. State, supra note 18, at 240,
176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.YS.2d at 36.
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negligent infliction of emotional distress could be based on existing prin-
ciples of foreseeability and proximate causation, the courts which required
"impact" argued that physical illness was not a natural consequence of
fright, and the risk of injury in such a manner was too remote. 2' One of
the leading American cases requiring "impact," Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 22 involved a woman who was frightened by an oncoming horse car of
the defendant railway. The horse car came so close to the plaintiff that
she stood between the horses' heads when it finally stopped. According
to medical testimony, the fright resulted in a miscarriage and subsequent
illness, but the court held the plaintiff could not recover for injuries re-
sulting from fright since there was no immediate personal injury.2 3
Among the reasons 24 given for this decision is the explanation that the dam-
ages were too remote.25
The contention that fright resulting in physical illness cannot be the
proximate result of negligence has been rejected on both legal and medi-
cal bases. Early decisions allowing recovery for the negligent infliction of
mental distress recognized that fright alone could proximately cause phy-
sical injuries. 26  This legal recognition is supported by medical evidence
that emotional distress can and does cause physical injury. 27
21. See, e.g., Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 50, 139 N.W. 1091 (1913);
Reed v. Ford, 129 Ky. 471, 475, 112 S.W. 600, 601 (1908); Spade v. Lynn & Boston
R.R., infra note 28, at 289, 47 N.E. at 89; Ward v. West Jersey and Seashore R.R.,
supra note 15, at 385, 47 A. at 562.
22. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled, Battalla v. State of New York,
supra note 18.
23. Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354.
24. One of the notorious arguments of the court was "[ilf it be admitted that no
recovery can be had for fright occasioned by the negligence of another it is somewhat
difficult to understand how a defendant would be liable for its consequences." Id.
Although this reasoning was followed by such cases as St. Louis, I.M. & S. R.R. v.
Bragg, supra note 13, at 405, 64 S.W. at 227; Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa 321,
324, 79 N.W. 134, 135 (1899); and Kentucky Traction and Terminal Co. v. Roman's
Guardian, supra note 16, at 292, 23 S.W.2d at 275; the logic of this argument has
been characterized as a non sequitur-unlike mere fright, when the damages are
physical and objective, they can be measured. See Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Bala-
doni, supra note 14, at 320, 73 So. at 205; Battalla v. State of New York, supra note
18 at 240, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 37; McNiece, Psychic Injury and
Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 26 (1949); Smith, supra note
5, at 211.
25. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra note 22, at 110, 45 N.E. at 355. The argu-
ment has some validity with respect to miscarriages. In a study of 1,000 non-crimi-
nal abortions, only one could be attributed to external trauma or emotional distress.
3 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 37.16 (1960).
26. See, e.g., Purcell v. St. Paul City R.R., supra note 14, at 137, 50 N.W. at
1034; Hill v. Kimball, supra note 14, at 215, 13 S.W. at 59.
27. See CANON, BODILY CHANGES IN PAIN, HUNGER, FEAR AND RAGE (2nd ed.
1953); DUNBAR, EMOTIONS AND BODILY CHANGES (4th ed. 1954); 3 LAWYERS' MEDI-
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The lack of proximate causation and remoteness arguments are further
weakened by one of the leading "impact" cases, Spade v. Lynn & Boston
R.R.,2 8 which has recognized that:
A physical injury may be directly traceable to fright, and so may be caused by it.
We cannot say, therefore, that such consequences may not flow proximately from
unintentional negligence, and if compensation in damages may be recovered for a
physical injury so caused, it is hard on principle to say why there should not also be
a recovery for the mere mental suffering when not accompanied by any percepti-
ble physical effects.29
While recognizing the causal relationship, the Massachusetts court justified
the contemporaneous physical injury requirement before it would allow re-
covery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, on the basis of a
"public policy" argument. ' This argument consists of the sub-arguments
that the causal connection is too difficult to establish;31 therefore to allow
recovery without the "impact" limitation would lead to fraudulent claims
and a flood of litigation.32  This has been recognized as the most viable
justification for the "impact rule." For example, in Chiuchiolo, Justice
Allen recognized that:
The only possibly adequate reason suggested for the exception to the rule of liability
is that of expediency, and the argument is made that in the long run justice will be
promoted with rather than without the exception because otherwise "this would
open a wide door for unjust claims, which could not successfully be met." 33
Despite this recognition of the "public policy" argument, it still has been
subjected to effective and persuasive criticism.
The explanations of why "public policy" does not provide a rational
CAL CYCLOPEDIA § 19.6 ( rev. ed. 1970). Smith, supra note 5, at 215-26, lists
clinical disorders probably related to emotional stimulation, and concludes by saying
that "[o]ur purpose in the foregoing discussion has been to show the scientific error
in assuming that psychic stimuli cannot cause injury . . . , on the other hand . . .
we do not say that injury is an invariable or even a frequent consequence." Id. at
225.
28. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
29. Id. at 288, 47 N.E. at 89.
30. Id.
31. id. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89. Accord, Kramer v. Ricksmeier, supra note 21, at
50, 139 N.W. at 1091; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra note 22, at 110, 45 N.E. at
354-55; Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 168-69, 142 A.2d 263, 267 (1958), over-
ruled, Niederman v. Brodsky, supra note 15.
32. Spade v. Lynn Boston R.R., supra note 28, at 290, 47 N.E. at 89. Accord,
Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R., supra note 15, at 386, 47 A. at 562; Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., supra note 22, at 110, 45 N.E. at 355.
33. Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, supra note 19, at 334, 150 A.
at 543. The public policy argument is supported to some extent by the observation
that ". . . lasting damage does not occur in "normal" individuals as a result of emo-
tional shock, however severe." Havard, Reasonable Foresight of Nervous Shock, 19
MoD. L. REV. 478, 482 (1956). It has also been noted in an exhaustive study of the
early nervous shock cases, that in a majority of these cases the plaintiff received
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basis for the existence of the impact rule can be categorized into four
basic arguments. First, the "public policy" argument has been refuted
by the realization that the increasing sophistication of medical knowledge
has reduced the difficulty of tracing with certainty the connection between
the negligence, fright, and resulting injury.34 Second, it has been properly
reasoned that it is no more difficult to assess the damage for mental dis-
tress without "impact," then it is to assess the damage for mental distress
with "impact" or when mental distress is tacked on as a parasitic dam-
age. 3 5  Third, it is exhorted that protection against fradulent claims is
contained within our legal system of expert witnesses, juries, and the safe-
guards of evidentiary standards.361 Fourth, it has been properly noted
that public policy requires courts to find ways to solve problems, not ex-
pedient ways to avoid them.3 7 Courts should not deny recovery for honest
claims because some dishonest ones might prevail. 38
an undeserved verdict because of the difficulty of proof. Smith, supra note 5, at 205.
However, it must be noted that Mr. Smith did not regard this as a justification of the
"impact rule," but as a reason to achieve better standards of proof. Id. at 306.
34. Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 236, 21 A.2d 402, 404 (1941); Robb
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. 1965); Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Plants, Inc., - Me. -, -, 269 A.2d 117, 121 (1970), overruling Herrick
v. Evening Express Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 A. 16 (1921) [Noted in Annot., 23
A.L.R. 358 (1923)]; Daley v. LaCroix, supra note 1, at -, 179 N.W.2d at 395;
Niederman v. Brodsky, supra note 15, at 405, 261 A.2d at 86. It has been ex-
plained that the "[plresence or absence of impact is not of much consequence in de-
termining the merits of a claim for injury through psychic stimuli." Smith, supra
note 5, at 299.
35. See, e.g., Orlo v. Connecticut Co., supra note 34, at 235, 21 A.2d at 404
(noting that mental suffering has long been a permissible element of damages. Id. at
236, 21 A.2d at 404); Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, supra note 19,
at 334, 150 A. at 543; Battalla v. State of New York, supra note 18, at 247, 219
N.Y.S. 2d at 37, 176 N.E.2d at 731; Niederman v. Brodsky, supra note 15, at 409,
261 A.2d at 88; Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 410, 234 A.2d 656, 659
(1967), citing Orlo v. Connecticut Co., supra note 34.
36. See, e.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 34, at 714; Falzone v. Busch,
45 N.J. 559, 567, 214 A.2d 12, 16 (1965); Battalla v. State of New York, supra note
18, at 242, 176 N.E. 2d at 732, 219 N.Y.S. 2d at 38; Niederman v. Brodsky, supra
note 15, at 409, 261 A.2d at 88; Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries, 41
BOSTON U.L. REV. 584, 591 (1961). The logic of this and other counter-arguments
to the "impact rule" led the Law Institute to delete the following caveat from the
1934 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: "The Institute expresses no opinion that the unrelia-
bility of the testimony necessary to establish the causal relation between the actor's
negligence and the other's illness or bodily harm may not make it proper for the court
of a particular jurisdiction to refuse, as a matter of administrative policy, to hold the
actor liable for harm to another which was brought about in the manner stated in
this Subsection." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(2) (1934), deleted in,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(2) (1948 Supp.).
37. Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 34, at 714.
38. Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, supra note 19, at 335, 150
A. at 543.
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The "flood of litigation" basis for the impact rule is grounded in the be-
lief that if the impact rule were eliminated ". . our Courts would be
swamped by a virtual avalanche of cases for damages for many situations
and cases hitherto unrecoverable . . . ,,39 However, apart from the fact
that this "flood" has not occurred,40 this argument has been persuasively
rebutted by the admonition that an " . . . increase should not be deter-
minative or relevant to the availability of a judicial forum for the adjudica-
tion of impartial individual rights."14'
DEVELOPMENT OF A RATIONAL LIABILITY FORMULA
The debate over the merits of the impact rule exemplifies the struggle
of the American courts to develop a rational liability formula for the negli-
gent infliction of mental distress. This struggle has been complicated by
the plethora of standards and formulas for recovery in the related areas
of mental distress litigation.
The problems involved are illustrated by the different requirements
needed to determine liability for an intentional or willful act as compared
with merely a negligent one. In its present state of development,42 the
law on intentional infliction of mental distress allows recovery without a
physical impact, often without a consequential physical injury. 43 Even
39. Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 271, 220 A.2d 646, 647 (1966), overruled,
Niederman v. Brodsky, supra note 15.
40. See Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 405, 165 N.W. 2d. 259, 263
(1969); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 242, 54 S.W. 944, 945 (1900).
In 1936, it was noted that the heaviest volume of litigation was in the states requiring
"impact" because of the extensive exceptions constructed by the courts of such
states. [1936] N.Y. LAw REVISION COMMISSION, ACT, RECOMMENDATION, AND
STUDY RELATING TO LIABILITY FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM FRIGHT OR SHOCK
375, 421.
41. Niederman v. Brodsky, supra note 15, at 412, 261 A.2d at 89. See Prosser,
Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 877
(1939).
42. For a history of the development of the law on intentional infliction of men-
tal distress, see Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L.
REV. 497 (1922); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Prosser, supra note 41; Note, Intentional Infliction of
Mental Suffering: A New Tort in Illinois, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 151 (1961).
43. See, e.g., Cohen v. Lion Products Co., 177 F. Supp. 486 (D.C. Mass. 1959);
Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137,
25 S.W.2d 428 (1930); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330,
240 P.2d 282 (1952); Fraser v. Blue Cross An. Hosp., 39 Hawaii 370 (1952);
Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); LaSalle Extension University
v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934) [Noted in Annot., 91 A.L.R. 1491
(1934)1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). See generally Annot.,
64 A.L.R.2d 100, 120 (1959); PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 11 (3d ed. 1964).
the jurisdictions which require "impact" for the negligent infliction of
mental distress dispense with the requirement when the defendant acts
intentionally or willfully. 44 The differing prerequisites for recovery can
make the determination of the nature of the defendant's conduct critical. 45
Similarly, "impact" and physical consequences are not determinants of
liability for the sui generis cases concerning the negligent transmission of a
telegraph message concerning death or illness, 46 and the mishandling of
corpses.4" The minority with respect to the telegraph cases allows re-
covery for emotional distress, alone, and of course does not require
physical impact. This is true in several states which ordinarily require
impact for the negligent infliction of mental distress.48
Although the courts requiring a contemporaneous physical injury or
impact have argued that the damage from mental disturbance is too diffi-
cult to measure, this objection has not prevented them from assessing the
value for mental distress as part of the damage of a physical injury.49 The
44. See, e.g., Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920) [Noted in
Annot., 11 A.L.R. 1115 (1921)]; Knierim v. Izzo, supra note 43; Barnett v. Collec-
tion Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah
2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961); Moore v. Jefferson Hospital, 208 Va. 438, 158 S.E.2d
124 (1967).
45. Compare Savage v. Boies, supra note 43, with Herrick v. Evening Express
Pub. Co., supra note 34.
46. See generally 1 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.3 at 672-73
(1956); PROSSER, supra note 43, at 348-49. For a collection of cases, see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 A (Appendix 1966).
47. See, e.g., St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. White, 192 Ark. 350, 91 S.W.2d 277 (1936);
Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App.2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind. App. 576, 12 N.E.2d 360 (1938); Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Hull, 113 Ky. 561, 68 S.W. 433 (1902); Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So.2d
891 (La. App. 1954); Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118 (1970);
See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 770 (1951); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Dead Bodies § 43
(1965); 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 8(5) (1966).
48. Mackay Tel. & Cable Co. v. Vaughan, 111 Ark. 504, 163 S.W. 158 (1914)
(statute authorizing recovery); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129
So. 743 (1930) (statute authorizing recovery); Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
93 Iowa 752, 62 N.W. 1 (1895); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Quigley, 129 Ky. 788,
112 S.W. 897 (1908). Contra, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, 60
N.E. 674 (1901); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, 9 So. 823 (1891);
Connell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 116 Mo. 34, 22 S.W. 345 (1893).
49. See, e.g., Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Caple, 207 Ark. 52, 58, 179 S.W.2d 151,
154 (1944); Horan v. Klein's-Sheridan, Inc., 62 111. App. 2d 455, 460, 211 N.E.2d 116
(1965) [Noted in Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 365 (1967)]; New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v.
Henderson, 237 Ind. 456, 477, 146 N.E.2d 531, 543 (1957); Gilman v. Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 345 Mass. 202, 207, 186 N.E.2d 454, 457 (1962). See generally
25 C.J.S. Damages § 65 (1966); PROSSER, supra note 43, at 349-50. For a discussion
of how damages for mental distress are "tacked on" to an invasion of the right of
privacy, see McNiece, supra note 24, at 63; Note, The Right to Mental Security, 16
U. FLA. L. REV. 540, 548 (1964).
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existence of the physical injury serves as a guarantee that the mental distress
is not feigned, ° and is probably the underlying basis of the impact rule.
However, the impact rule has been applied in such a manner as to increase
the problem of ascertaining the liability for negligent infliction of men-
tal distress.
The courts which require impact have often circumvented its alleged
purpose by finding the slightest impact a satisfactory fulfillment of the
rule. It has been noted that once "[t]he magic formula 'impact' is pro-
nounced the door opens to the full joy of a complete recovery."' An illus-
tration of how the impact rule is "stretched" is found in the case of Homans
v. Boston Elevated Railway,5 2 where the plaintiff was thrown against a seat
in one of the defendant's cars as a result of a collision occasioned by the
defendant's negligence. The plaintiff was allowed to recover for mental
suffering of a hysterical nature, without the necessity of showing that the
battery was related to the mental distress.5 3  In numerous other situations,
occurrences, such as the inhalation of smoke, 5 4 have satisfied the impact
rule despite the fact this slight physical contact often has no relation to
the cause of the emotional distress. 55
The impact rule has also been satisfied when as a direct result of defend-
ant's negligence, the plaintiff's fright results in a physical injury. In Com-
stock v. Wilson,' 6 the defendant negligently bumped the plaintiff's auto-
mobile. The plaintiff stepped out of the automobile, fainted, and fractured
her skull as a result. The plaintiff was allowed to recover in spite of the
fact that she fainted because of excitement over the minor accident, and
not because of any fright from the impact itself.57  This type of case is
50. See Orlo v. Connecticut Co., supra note 34, at 239, 21 A.2d at 405; PROSSER,
supra note 43, at 350.
51. Goodrich, supra note 42, at 504.
52. 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902).
53. Id. at 458, 62 N.E. at 737. Accord, Petition of United States, 418 F.2d 264,
268 (1st Cir. 1969).
54. Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930).
55. See, e.g., Arkansas Motor Coaches Ltd. v. Whitlock, 199 Ark. 820, 136
S.W.2d 184 (1940) (constructive physical injury); Boston v. Chesapeake & Ohio
R.R., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945) (trivial jolt); Kentucky Traction & Termi-
nal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, supra note 16 (slight burn); Kisiel v. Holyoke Street
Ry., 240 Mass. 29, 132 N.E. 622 (1921) (slight jar); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.
R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in the eye); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100,
138-43 (1959); PROSSER, supra note 43, at 350-51; Brody, Negligently Inflicted
Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VILLANOVA L. REV. 232, 234 (1962); Mc-
Niece, supra note 24, at 51-58; Smith, supra note 5, at 300. But see Sullivan v. H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc., 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960).
56. 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931).
57. See Smith, supra note 5, at 243-44 n.161.
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known as "the injury from without"58 situation, and is another example of
the problems involved in determining liability for invasion of mental tran-
quillity.
In view of the persuasive arguments for the abolition of the impact
rule, and its strained application, it is not surprising that the number of
jurisdictions which still adhere to it have diminished. 50  Of the states
which have ruled on the issue, thirty do not require a contemporaneous
physical impact to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 10 While Illinois can still be classified as a supporter of the impact
rule,"1 in a recent decision 6 2 the Illinois Appellate Court recognized a
strong argument for permitting recovery for negligently inflicted mental
suffering without physical impact. However, the court declined to rule on
the issue, since the plaintiff failed to prove the facts upon which she pred-
icated her mental suffering.6 3  It is likely that given the appropriate cir-
cumstances, Illinois will discard its impact rule. Recognition of the ma-
jority rule has also occurred in Florida, 64 and Mississippi,6" indicating
58. See Freedman v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry. Co., 299 Mass. 246, 12 N.E.2d 739(1938); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914);
Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955); McNiece, supra
note 24, at 44; Smith, supra note 5, at 317. But see Bosley v. Andrews, supra note
31.
59. Arkansas: St. Louis, I.M. & S. R.R. v. Bragg, supra note 13; Florida:
Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950); Illinois: West Chicago St. R.R. Co.
v. Liebig, 79 I11. App. 567 (1899); Indiana: Boston v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., supra
note 55; Iowa: Kramer v. Ricksmeier, supra note 21; Kentucky: Kentucky Traction
& Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, supra note 16; Massachusetts: Spade v. Lynn
& Boston R.R., supra note 28; Missouri: McCardle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods
Co., supra note 13; Utah: Samms v. Eccles, supra note 44 (dictum); Virginia: See
Herman v. Eastern Airlines, supra note 16; but see Penick v. Mirro, 189 F. Supp. 947(E.D. Va. 1960). The District of Columbia can be included within the jurisdictions
requiring "impact" although its requirement is not absolute. See Perry v. Capital
Traction Co., 32 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 577 (1929).
60. See Appendix infra.
61. Braun v. Craven, supra note 13; West Chicago St. R.R. v. Liebig, supra note
59. See generally Corey v. Hiberly, 346 F.2d 368, 370 (7th Cir. 1965). But see
Knierim v. Izzo, supra note 43 where many of the justifications for the "impact rule"
are attacked.
62. Halden v. Kayser Roth Corp., 92 Il1. App. 2d 240, 235 N.E.2d 426 (1968)
(dictum).
63. Id. at 245, 235 N.E.2d at 429.
64. Hollie v. Radcliff, 200 So. 2d 616, 618 (Fla. App. 1967), wherein the court
explained that: ". . . we must recognize that there has been a perceptible trend in
this and other jurisdictions toward a relaxing of the said [impact] rule. In the case
at bar, however, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the trend in Florida to
relax the rule has gone to the extent that damages are recoverable for mental injuries
in the absence of an impact ...there was impact sufficient to satisfy the 'impact
rule.'"
65. Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 149, 150 So. 2d 154, 158 (1963)
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that they may do likewise.
DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY
An examination of the liability formulas adopted by the Wallace and
Daley decisions reveals that the Maine and Michigan courts have turned
toward what is basically a negligence liability formula-i.e., duty, breach
of duty, proximate causation, and injury."0 In determining when an act
becomes negligent, it has been explained that "[t]he risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed ... ."61 However, the scope of
duty in the emotional distress field has not been clearly defined. It has
been explained that ". . . the retreat from the 'impact rule' has been
marked by rear-guard actions in which other mechanical rules have cut
off duty short of the full range of the reasonably foreseeable. '" 68 The con-
tribution of the Wallace and Daley decisions to the development of a ra-
tional liability formula for the negligent infliction of mental distress can be
analyzed by comparing the degree that they conform to a pure negligence
formula while being complimented by practical standards to the extent
they adopt mechanical tests.69
"FEAR OF IMPACT" AND "ZONE OF DANGER"
Two of the limitations which remain despite the abolition of the impact
rule are the "fear of impact" and "physical zone-of-danger" concepts.
The "fear of impact" limitation, first expressed in the dictum of
(dictum), wherein the court recognized that: "Many courts have held that there may
be a recovery for the physical consequences of mental injury due to fright occasioned
by the negligent act of the defendant."
66: The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated: "... we adopt the rule that
in those cases where it is established by a fair preponderance of the evidence there is
a proximate causal relationship between an act of negligence and reasonably forsee-
able mental and emotional suffering by a reasonably forseeable plaintiff, such proven
damages are compensable even though there is no discernable trauma from external
causes." Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., supra note 34, at -, 269 A.2d
at 121. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that ". . . where a definite and objec-
tive physical injury is produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused
by defendant's negligent conduct, the plaintiff in a properly pleaded and proved ac-
tion may recover damages for such physical consequences to himself not withstanding
the absence of any physical impact upon plaintiff at the time of the mental shock."
Daley v. LaCroix, supra note 1, at -, 179 N.W.2d at 395.
67. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
68. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 4, at 1036.
69. It is interesting that in many of the cases of first impression, the courts which
adopted the "impact rule" talked in terms of foreseeability and proximate causation,
but then adopted the mechanical "impact rule." See, e.g., Braun v. Craven, supra
note 13. It has been pointed out that in ten of thirteen cases of first impression, re-
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Justice Kennedy in Dulieu v. White & Sons,70 has been accepted by the
Restatement of Torts,71 and by numerous case decisions.72  Basically,
this doctrine limits recovery for mental distress to situations where the
negligence of the defendant places the plaintiff in fear of immediate per-
sonal physical injury. Despite its widespread acceptance, the rule has been
characterized as one of the arbitrary limitations which are defined as
encrustations on the legal liability formula, not logical limitations derived from
its basic terms. They are artificial rules intended to limit liability or to simplify ad-
ministration of legal doctrine. They are not specific projections of more persuasive
tort principles. 7.3
The English courts have rejected the "fear of impact" doctrine, 74 and a
number of the American courts have discarded it. 7 5 The requirement is an
inadequate test for situations such as Wallace, where the distress is not
really from the fear of impact but rather nausea develops from the discovery
that one's food is contaminated."0
Another argument against the "fear of impact" limitation is that ".
conduct which foreseeably threatens physical harm from bodily impact
does not necessarily threaten physical harm from emotional disturbance
covery would not have been allowed if a pure negligence approach had been used, and
that the courts went further than necessary by adopting the "impact rule." 1936 N.Y.
LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 40, at 396-406. See, e.g., Nelson v. Craw-
ford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899), overruled Daley v. LaCroix, supra note 1.
70. Supra note 11, at 675, wherein the court explained: "The shock in order to
give one a cause of action, must be one which arises from a reasonable fear of im-
mediate personal injury to oneself."
71. "If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of caus-
ing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other
similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely
from internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the
actor from liability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 436(2) (1965).
72. See, e.g., Orlo v. Connecticut Co., supra note 34, at 239, 21 A.2d at 405;
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 34, at -, 210 A.2d at 714-15; Falzone v.
Busch, supra note 36, at 569, 214 A.2d at 17; Niederman v. Brodsky, supra note 15, at
413, 261 A.2d at 90; Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., supra note 35, at 410, 234 A.2d
at 660.
73. Smith, supra note 5, at 235.
74. Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers, [1925] 1 K.B. 141.
75. See Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Bowman v.
Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275
N.W. 674 (1937), afi'd on rehearing, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N.W. 890 (1938) [Noted in
Annot., 122 A.L.R. 1468 (1939)]; Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash.
578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935). Cf. Hill v. Kimball, supra note 14; Lambert v. Brewster,
97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924).
76. See Smith, supra note 5, at 239. For an illustration of the diverse approaches
to the contaminated drink cases, compare Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants Inc.,
supra note 34, and Kenny v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 A. 343 (1925) with Cush-
ing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Francis, 206 Okla. 553, 245 P.2d 84 (1952).
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without bodily impact."'77 An example of this is found in Williamson v.
Bennett,78 where the defendant, driving a small sports car, lightly hit the
side of the plaintiff's automobile. Although the plaintiff heard the
sound of the collision, it was so quiet that she thought a child had ridden
a bicycle into the side of her car. While the plaintiff suffered severe emo-
tional distress, it was due to her own pre-existing susceptibility, 79 and was
not a normal reaction to the collision. Here the court properly denied re-
covery, since the conduct which threatened physical harm did not threaten
severe emotional disturbance.
The "physical zone-of-danger" limitation is a logical extension of the
"fear of impact" requirement. This doctrine restricts the scope of liability
for negligently inflicted mental distress to persons within the range of
physical danger.8 0 The test is usually applied to deny recovery for emo-
tional distress in the bystander cases, where an individual witnesses an in-
jury to another. For example, in Guilmeite v. Alexander"' a mother
standing on her front porch witnessed an accident on the street in front of
her home. Her daughter had just stepped out of a school bus when the
defendant, while negligently driving his automobile, hit the five year old
daughter. The mother was not allowed to recover for her severe emo-
tional distress, because the court would not extend the scope of legal duty
beyond the zone of danger.8 2  The "zone-of-danger" limitation has also
been classified as arbitrary and mechanical, since it obscures the real ques-
tion of whether one may recover for the emotional distress caused by wit-
nessing an injury negligently inflicted upon another.8s3 Despite this criti-
cism, the limitation has been almost universally accepted. 8 4
77. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 4, at 1038.
78. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
79. For a discussion of the problem of the hypersensitive plaintiff, see text ac-
companying note 91 infra.
80. See generally Brody, supra note 55, at 238-39; Goodhart, The Shock Cases
and Area of Risk, 16 Mo. L. REV. 14 (1953); Comment, Emotional Distress Negli-
gently Inflicted Upon Spectator Plaintiff-A Suggested Model for Indentifying Pro-
tected Plaintiffs Based on Relational Interest, 1969 UTAH L. REv. 396 (1969).
81. - Vt.-, 259 A.2d 12 (1969).
82. Id. at-, 259 A.2d at 14.
83. Brody, supra note 55, at 236. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 746, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72,84, 441 P.2d 912, 924 (1968) [Noted in Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1316
(1968)]; Goodhart, supra note 80, at 23-24; Comment, Negligence and the Inflic-
tion of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. Cm.
L. REV. 512 (1968) [hereinafter called Reappraisal].
84. See, e.g., Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959); Cleve-
land, C., C. & St. L. R.R. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900); Ma-
honey v. Dankwart, supra note 24; Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227 (1880); Hyatt v.
Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867); Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728
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To eliminate the use of these mechanical limitations, many legal schol-
ars have advocated a negligence liability formula. This liability formula
measures the scope of duty by determining whether the prudent actor could
have reasonably foreseen that his conduct created a substantial risk of
producing serious emotional harm to the average person s.8 .
Through a footnote,8 6 the Daley decision indicates that it follows the Re-
statement view, which requires that the negligent conduct create an un-
reasonable risk of bodily harm,8 7 but the holding itself does not require
it.S8 The Wallace decision does not mention any requirement of fear of im-
pact, but does require a ". . . proximate causal relationship between an
act of negligence and reasonably foreseeable mental and emotional suf-
fering by a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff ... .1,,9 This formula is flex-
ible and free of artificial limitations. It is very close to the above-men-
tioned formula advocated by the legal scholars, and is adaptable to situa-
tions where a mother witnesses the negligent injury inflicted upon her
child.9°
PERSONS OF UNUSUAL SUSCEPTIBILITY
Another limitation which remains despite the abolition of the impact
rule is the rule that "[a]bsent specific knowledge of plaintiff's unusual sen-
sitivity, there should be no recovery for hypersensitive mental disturbance
where a normal individual would not be affected under the circum-
(1968); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419
(1969); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) [Noted in
Annot., 98 A.L.R. 394 (1935)]. See generally, Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970);
Annot., 18 A.L.R. 2d 216 (1951); 38 AM. JUR. 2d Fright, Shock, and Mental Distur-
bance § 36 (1968). Contra Dillon v. Legg, supra note 83. See Owens v. Liverpool
Corp., [1939] 1 K.B. 394. Note that liability may exist if the act witnessed was an
intentional or willful act. See, e.g., Rogers v. Williard, supra note 44; Mahnke v.
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Hill v. Kimball, supra note 14; Jeppsen v.
Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916); Lambert v. Brewster, supra note 75. But
see McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S.W. 742 (1912).
85. See, e.g., 2 HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 4, at 1039; Brody, supra note 55,
at 244; Goodhart, supra note 80, at 23-24; Havard, supra note 33, at 494; Smith,
supra note 5, at 303; Reappraisal, supra note 83, at 528.
86. Daley v. LaCroix, supra note 1, at -, 179 N.W.2d. at 395, n.13.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (2) (1965).
88. Daley v. LaCroix, supra note 1, at -, 179 N.W.2d at 395.
89. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants Inc., supra note 34, at -, 269 A.2d at
121.
90. See Dillon v. Legg, supra note 83. But see Tobin v. Grossman, supra note 84,
in which the Court of Appeals of New York would not extend liability to a mother
witnessing injury to her child, basically on public policy grounds, despite the flexible
liability formula established in Battalla v. State of New York, supra note 18.
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stances." 9 1 This limitation on the scope of duty is illustrated in Kaufman
v. Miller,92 where the defendant negligently drove her automobile into a
truck-trailer driven by the plaintiff. The collision was so minor that the
plaintiff thought he had brushed the curb of a bridge, yet when he dis-
covered there had been an accident, he became nervous. Over a period
of months the plaintiff had dizzy spells, was briefly hospitalized, and was
mentally unable to drive a truck. The testimony of a psychiatrist revealed
that the plaintiff had a pre-existing neurosis, due in part to a prior accident
which had left him with guilt feelings. The subsequent accident with the
defendant triggered a conversion reaction, essentially because the plaintiff
realized he might have caused injury without being aware of it, and thus
unable to prevent it. In view of plaintiff's pre-existing susceptibility to a
conversion reaction, the Supreme Court of Texas held that as a matter of
law ". . . the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen the injuries
suffered by the plaintiff as a natural and probable consequence of her
negligent conduct."9
Restricting liability for emotional distress to negligent conduct which
would affect the person of normal sensibility has not been classified as a
mechanical limitation, but a logical restriction compatible with a foresee-
ability-proximate causation formula.9 4  Using the appropriate standard
to define mental disturbance," and scientific criteria of proof,9 6 it is ap-
propriate for the jury to determine whether the defendant's conduct would
have caused serious mental distress in the normal person in the plaintiff's
position.9 7 To do otherwise would create too great a burden upon the in-
dividual in his everyday affairs. Daley, by explicitly adopting this re-
striction,9 8 and Wallace, by implicitly requiring it,nn have not constructed
a mechanical prerequisite to liability.
91. Daley v. LaCroix, supra note 1, at -, 179 N.W.2d at 395.
92. 414 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1967).
93. Id. at 170.
94. See Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., supra note 28, at 289, 47 N.E. at 89; Pur-
cell v. St. Paul City R.R., supra note 14, at 139, 50 N.W. at 1035; 2 HARPER AND
JAMES, supra note 4, at 1035; Smith, supra note 5, at 256; Reappraisal, supra note 83,
at 518.
95. Mental disturbance which does not qualify for compensation would include
mere upset, dismay, humiliation or anger. It has been suggested that the harm neces-
sary is that ". . . mental distress serious enough to require medical attention." Re-
appraisal, supra note 83, at 517.
96. See Smith, supra note 5, at 285.
97. Brody, supra note 55, at 256; Smith, supra note 5, at 242; Reappraisal, supra
note 83, at 518.
98. Daley v. LaCroix, supra note 1, at -, 179 N.W.2d at 395.
99. The limitation is inherent in the statement that there be ". . . reasonably for-
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THE NEED FOR A PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCE
Despite the abolition of the impact rule, a well settled rule is that there
can be no recovery for fright alone when the offending act is simple negli-
gence. 100 This is basically a policy decision, but it is rationalized on the
concept that emotions such as "upset," "dismay," and "anger" are trivial,
and to require people to avoid inflicting such reactions would be unrea-
sonable. 10 1 When emotional distress is caused through an act of negli-
gence, recovery can only be had if there is a physical consequence which is
the natural and probable result of the fright. 10 2 The definition of a "phy-
sical consequence" will often determine whether or not there will be lia-
bility. While nervous shock has been held to be a physical injury, 0 3 in
Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital0 4 the plaintiff was not allowed to recover
for the shock to her nervous system which occurred when the defendant
hospital negligently gave her the wrong baby, because mental suffering
and loss of sleep was not deemed to be a physical consequence. 0 5
A comparison of the Wallace and Daley decisions indicates the Wallace
decision is more liberal, since it allows the plaintiff to recover for the
mental and emotional suffering negligently inflicted by another pro-
vided that it is "substantial and manifested by objective symptomatol-
ogy," °0 while Daley requires a "definite and objective physical injury.' 10 7
By focusing on the physical consequence, the Daley decision is more com-
patible with the previous decisions allowing recovery for negligently in-
flicted emotional distress. The cause of action is viewed as one for per-
sonal injury, with the emotional distress merely being a link in the chain
of causation between the act of negligence and the physical injury.' 08 It
has been explained that:
seeable mental and emotional suffering by a reasonably forseeable plaintiff ....
Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants Inc., supra note 34, at -, 269 A.2d at 121.
100. See generally Petition of United States, supra note 53, at 268; Annot., 64
A.L.R.2d 100, 117 (1959); PROSSER, supra note 43, at 348. But see Clegg v. Hard-
ware Mutual Casualty Co., 264 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1963).
101. See Reappraisal, supra note 79, at 517.
102. See, e.g., Orlo v. Connecticut Co., supra note 34, at 239, 21 A.2d at 405;
Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 510, 159 P. 401, 402 (1916); Purcell v. St. Paul City
R.R., supra note 14, at 134, 50 N.W. at 1034.
103. See, e.g., Sloane v. Southern California Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320,
322-23 (1896); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 403-04, 55 S.E. 778, 780 (1906).
104. 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952).
105. Id. at 235, 249 P.2d at 844.
106. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants Inc., supra note 34, at -, 269 A.2d at
121.
107. Daley v. LaCroix, supra note 1, at -, 179 N.W.2d at 395.
108. See, e.g., Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, supra note 19, at
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The plaintiff is complaining of a bodily injury, of the invasion of an interest
zealously protected by the law. The defendant has negligently endangered the
plaintiff's bodily safety by conduct which might have caused an injurious physical im-
pact. Hence, the only question is whether . .. it is expedient to allow the plaintiff
to trace the causal connection through a psychic link in the chain of causation. 109
By focusing on the emotional disturbance, the Wallace decision represents
the trend toward increased protection of the mind and emotions.
A further comparison reveals that while Daley suggests a need for ex-
pert testimony, 110 Wallace allowed the plaintiff to recover based upon
the judgment of the jury predicated upon simply their "ordinary knowl-
edge from everyday experience." 11' This delegation of responsibility
to the jury focuses on the problem involved in the emotional distress
area, as seen by several legal writers. 112 It has been explained that by
the use of mechanical rules, such as the "impact rule," "fear of impact"
rule, and "zone-of-danger" rule, the courts have upset the division of re-
sponsibility between the court and jury. Little is left for the jury to de-
cide when applying rules based on a policy decision rather than principles
of tort liability.' 13  The suggested alternative is the application of the
usual standards of proximate causation and foreseeability, first by the
jury, then subject to the judicial review of the court.114
CONCLUSION
The Wallace and Daley decisions represent the continuing growth in the
mental distress field. Both decisions have discarded the impact rule, which
has been considered an arbitrary standard. The abolition of this rule
means there will be a greater uniformity of rights, and the duty of an indi-
vidual will be measured by a more appropriate standard. The act of dis-
carding the impact rule is, by itself, enough to provide Maine and Michi-
gan with a more rational liability formula for the negligent infliction
of mental distress. However, the Maine decision appears to go even
further, because Wallace places a greater emphasis on emotional suffer-
334, 150 A. at 543; Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 149, 123 N.W. 625, 627
(1909); Lambert, supra note 36, at 599. The rule, as phrased by the American Law
Institute embodies this idea. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(2) (1965).
109. Magruder, supra note 42, at 1036.
110. Daley v. LaCroix, supra note 1, at -, 179 N.W.2d at 395.
111. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants Inc., supra note 34, at -, 269 A.2d
at 122.
112. Brody, supra note 55, at 243. See, Reappraisal, supra note 83, at 528. Cf.
Smith, supra note 5, at 302-06.
113. Note, however, that even proximate causation has been admitted to be a
policy decision. Smith, supra note 5, at 272.
114. Brody, supra note 55, at 244.
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ing. By focusing on the foreseeability of substantial mental suffering,
the Wallace formula is adaptable to the bystander situations. Maine
could, for example, follow the recent California decision' 15 and grant re-
covery to a mother who has witnessed her child being run over due to the
negligent driving of another. Whether Maine will take this next logical
step and impose liability for negligently inflicted distress to a bystander
remains to be seen.
Ronald G. Silbert
115. Dillon v. Legg, supra note 83.
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APPENDIX
The following jurisdictions do not require an "impact" as a prerequisite to
recovery for the negligent infliction of mental distress: Federal: Kaufman
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 947 (1956); Alabama: Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni,
15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); California: Sloane v. Southern
California Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896); Colorado: Cf. Hopper v.
United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Colo. 1965); Connecticut: Orlo v.
Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A. 2d 402 (1941); Delaware: Robb
Pennsylvania R.R., - Del. -, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Georgia: Usry v.
Small, 103 Ga. App. 144, 118 S.E.2d 719 (1961); Kansas: Whitsel v.
Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 159 P. 401 (1916) (Dictum); Clemm v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 126 Kan. 181, 268 P. 103 (1928) (Dead Body); Louisiana:
Laird v. Natchitoches Oil Mill, 10 La. App. 191, 120 So. 692 (1929);
Maine: Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., - Me. -, 269 A.2d
117 (1970); Maryland: Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73
A. 688 (1909); Michigan: Daley v. LaCroix, - Mich. -, 179 N.W.2d
390 (1970); Minnesota: Purcell v. St. Paul City R.R., 48 Minn. 134, 50
N.W. 1034 (1892); Montana: Cashin v. Northern Pac. R.R., 96 Mont. 92,
28 P.2d 862 (1934); Nebraska: Hanford v. Omaha & C.B. St. R.R., 113
Neb. 423, 203 N.W. 643 (1925) [Noted in Annot., 40 A.L.R. 970
(1925)]; New Hampshire: Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tail-
ors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540 (1930); New Jersey: Falzone v. Busch,
45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); New York: Battalla v. Sate, 10 N.Y.2d
237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); North Carolina: Kim-
berly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906); Ohio: See Held v.
Red Malcuit, Inc., 41 Ohio Op. 2d 210, 230 N.E.2d 674 (C.P. 1967);
Oklahoma: Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 195 F.2d 241 (10th Cir.
1952); Oregon: Salmi v. Columbia, & N. River R.R., 75 Ore. 200, 146 P.
819 (1915); Pennsylvania: Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261
A.2d 84 (1970); Rhode Island: Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186,
66 A. 202 (1907); South Carolina: Mack v. South Bound R.R., 52 S.C.
323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898); South Dakota: Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S.D.
396, 167 N.W. 398 (1918); Tennessee: Memphis Street R.R. v. Bern-
stein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917); Texas: Hill v. Kimball,
76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890); Vermont: Savard v. Cody Chevrolet,
Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967); Virginia: See Penick v. Mirro,
189 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Va. 1960); Washington: Frazee v. Western Dairy
Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935); West Virginia: Lam-
bert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924); Wisconsin: Colla
v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957) [Noted in Annot.,
64 A.L.R.2d 95 (1959)].
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